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Introduction
 
Palestinians must surely count as one of the most studied peoples on the planet.However,in
 
spite of the miles of library shelves filled with studies of them and of the‘Palestinian problem’
they remain curiously unknown and unfamiliar in many basic respects.Given the international
 
importance of the Palestinian problem, this is of both theoretical and practical importance.
Theoretical, because the Palestinian problem is an exemplar par excellence of local and
 
national developments producing international and global relevances and effects.It is therefore
 
important that we understand the nature and details of the interrelation between these different
 
levels.Practical,because while the Palestinian problem is often considered the most critical
 
problem for world security it is first and foremost a local problem, played out each day in
 
hundreds of local communities whose first concern is for their immediate circumstances.As
 
such,one cannot hope to understand‘what is going on’without understanding the circumstances
 
and structures affecting and generating local actions and practices.In this paper I attempt to
 
address this gap between the simultaneous fame and unfamiliarity of the Palestinians by
 
developing a ‘discourse of familiarity’through a theoretically informed study of the local
 
structures and circumstances of a particular community and its members’actions and responses
 
to the wider world. This is particularly relevant in an historical period in which global
 
structures and circumstances are seen by many as intruding increasingly into the local domain,
with the latter too often losing out.
One reason would-be champions of‘local diversity’against‘global convergence’see the local
 
as so greatly threatened is that they have paid insufficient critical attention to the ways in
 
which global circumstances are negotiated by local communities through local structures.I have
 
argued elsewhere(Kaim 1997,1998,2003a,2003b)that if we are to understand the social and
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cultural implications of the relation between the local level and others we must study the local
 
level.This is the level at which action takes place,and it is through action that (social and
 
cultural) structure is connected to (physical, geographical, technological, or other) circum-
stance.Without understanding this relation between structure and circumstance we cannot
 
understand social and cultural change or continuity,diversity,or convergence.
This paper,then,seeks to present just such a local study.It concerns the village of Tustas
(not the village’s real name),which is a Palestinian village on the West Bank,nestled in the
 
Judean hills overlooking the Palestinian plain.It is a mixed Christian and Muslim village with
 
a total resident population of approximately 1,000,about two thirds of which is Christian and
 
one third Muslim.The internal structures and dispositions of the community (as any other,
anywhere else)greatly influence its members’possibilities for action and response.In this paper
 
I show how kinship and religion are vitally important in this, as idioms. Their social and
 
political relevances shape the grass-roots reaction of these Palestinians to the circumstances
 
confronting them.The way villagers use ethnic, nationalist, and international discourses to
 
stake claims as Palestinians shows up important links between local political action and the
 
national struggle.Not only is the national struggle indisputably influential on local society,but
 
local action and structures are crucial to the national effort.
Ties of blood and ties of faith here, as elsewhere, mean much.Kin logics of unity and
 
fragmentation and religious logics of unity and fragmentation form and shape apprehensions of
 
unity and fragmentation and,in so doing,help create the social and community reality of unity
 
and fragmentation.
Kin Logics of Unity and Fragmentation
 
Patai (1962)noted pride in descent as one of the most significant cultural themes in the
 
Middle East.Cohen (1965)also found it to be an important feature of life among the clans of
 
Bint al-Hudu?d.‘Asabı?ya (or,blood links)was so important that members of clans not consid-
ered to share such a valid link of blood,and hence not to be‘asabı?,tried“always to conceal the
 
fact that they...［were］...not descendants of one ancestor”(Cohen 1965:109).Tustasi Muslims
 
follow this pattern.Tustasi Christians,on the other hand,freely admit their diverse ancestry
 
while at the same time admiring the Muslims for being ‘asabı?. Their frank admission of
 
heterogeneity indicates that they at least feel no particular advantage in maintaining fictions
 
of common descent,in contrast to the Muslims.
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Different vernacular terms used
 
The descent system operating in Tustas is segmentary.From the largest to the smallest unit
 
the vernacular terms used are ‘ashı
 
f
?ra (commonly translated as ‘tribe’), hamu?la (clan), ‘a?’ila
(extended family,the constituent families of a hamu?la),da?r (household),and usra (immediate
 
family).Although the basic meaning of the term‘da?r’is‘household’,it is commonly used to refer
 
to units sharing descent from a common ancestor. The term itself originally referred to a
 
defined living space such as a house or a group of rooms built together to form a compound and
 
hence to the related people living there.It later came to refer to such related families even when
 
not living in the same building.Today,individuals no longer need live together in a da?r (as a
 
physical structure)in order to qualify as members of a da?r(as a constituent family).The word
 
itself is integral to the name of any particular hamu?la or constituent family of a hamu?la,where
 
descent can be traced back to a common ancestor.The primary significant connection between
 
people is descent from an original male ancestor,distant in time.Connection with others(both
 
living and dead)is basically through relations of patrilineal descent from that ancestor.The
 
notion of relatedness through common ancestry entailed in this is summed up in the vernacular
 
term‘asabi’.Only those households,‘a?’ilas,and hamu?las which are‘asabi enjoy the epithet‘da?r’.
Categories of descent and the logic of relation behind them are the same for both Muslims
 
and Christians.However, the different circumstances and structures of the two confessions
 
mean that the significance of the logic in each is different.Of primary importance is the fact
 
that in neither of the village’s two Christian clans do the constituent families share common
 
ancestors nor do they claim any,while by way of contrast,the Muslims claim common descent
 
for themselves in a variety of contexts,and say it is manifested in their being a single hamu?la?.
Being ‘asabi and the logic of relatedness
 
Each of the Christian clans(the Faras and the Ghaza?l)is made up of five constituent families.
These‘a?’ilas represent the highest level to which common ancestry is or can be traced.The
 
Faras consist of da?r Azraq,da?r Ahmar,da?r Abyad,da?r Aswad,and da?r Akhdar.Da?r Ahmar
 
is alone among the Christian amilies in retaining a single name for all its members.All the
 
others are divided into smaller families also called‘da?r’.Among the Ghaza?l are the constituent
 
families da?r Matra?n,da?r Malik,da?r Sheikh,da?r Emı?r,and da?r Khu?rı?each of which is further
 
1 This lack of shared ancestry among the constituent families of hamu?las was quite common in
 
Palestine generally,indeed to such an extent that the hamu?la might be termed a patronymic structure
 
rather than a patrilineal one(cf.Atran 1986).
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divided into three,four,or five segments,once again using names deriving from the level below
 
that of the constituent family,that of the immediate descendants of the shared ancestor.
Relation between the constituent families of either clan is accepted (as a result of intermar-
riage over generations).However,relation between the clans is denied,even though marriage
 
between them is so common as not to be thought unusual.The Christians thus emphasise the
 
separateness of the two clans despite myriad and complex kin links between them.This is in
 
direct contrast not only to the concealment of diverse kinship found by Cohen,but also to the
 
practices of Tustas’own Muslims.These latter variously classify themselves as one,two,or
 
even three different clans.Of these at the most only two, in fact, descend from the original
 
ancestor.
There is a dominant Muslim clan,da?r Ishaq,descended from Isha?q himself and a subordinate
 
clan,the Wazı?r,which predates Ishaq’s arrival in the village.Da?r Isha?q divides into two clans,
da?r Abu?Ahmad and da?r Abu?Mahmu?d,which descend from two sons of Ishaq who went under
 
those names.The Wazı?r is also made up of two groups:the eponymous Wazı?r and the Na?bulsı?,
but the latter are never reckoned to be a separate clan.The Wazı?r are commonly taken,along
 
with da?r Abu?Ahmad and da?r Abu?Mahmu?d as part of the single clan,da?r Isha?q.This reference
 
to the Muslims as a single clan is the most common.However,the distinction into two clans
 
has two patterns:the Wazı?r on the one hand and da?r Isha?q on the other,or,more commonly
(illustrating the total eclipse of the Wazı?r)by separating da?r Isha?q into two:da?r Abu?Ahmad
 
and da?r Abu?Mahmu?d.These various divisions and combinations are made by members of da?r
 
Isha?q, the Wazı?r, and both the clans of the Christians;that is to say, by all villagers. The
 
reasons for these shifting definitions (which contrast markedly with the Christians’stable
 
division into two “unrelated”clans)are complex. They are also important as they point to
 
significant structural features of the two communities.Firstly,however,a brief outline of the
 
background to this abundance of kin groups is in order.
As mentioned above,the politically dominant group among the Muslims(da?r Ishaq)descends
 
from Isha?q who arrived in the village about four hundred years ago.The Wazı?r were Muslims
 
already in residence.The bulk of the Wazı?r were expelled by Isha?q and his relatives,who by
 
this action became the main Muslim group in the village. Some of the Wazı?r remained and
 
intermarried with da?r Isha?q (that is, Isha?q and his relatives at that time). In the past two
 
hundred years small families of Muslims have come to Tustas and have,by and large,been
 
classified with another group,the Na?bulsı?,the first of whom came from Na?blus.The Na?bulsı?
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are grouped together and the two groups(the Na?bulsı?and the Wazı?r)are collectively referred
 
to as,‘the Wazı?r.’
The Wazı?r and the Na?bulsı?neither use‘da?r’in referring to themselves nor are granted it by
 
others,consistent with‘da?r’expressing relatedness through a common ancestor.The Na?bulsı?
lack a common ancestor and the common ancestor of the Wazı?r was socially annihilated by
 
being expelled.The Wazı?r have also been encompassed by da?r Isha?q through the marriage to
 
members of the latter of all those who remained in the village at the time of the expulsion.At
 
the time of the expulsion members of the Wazı?r married to women from da?r Isha?q were allowed
 
to remain after agreeing not to harm Isha?q or the interests of his kin group.That they were
 
married to women from da?r Isha?q meant that they could retain their name as Wazı?r.However,
that they received those women from da?r Isha?q placed the latter in the superior position of wife
-giver in this intensely patrilineal?community.The social encompassment and subjugation of
 
the Wazı?r by Isha?q and his kin is thus expressed symbolically in this lop-sided‘exchange.’
The discreteness of Wazı?r and Na?bulsı?ancestry is universally known and acknowledged.In
 
addition there are there are several families of different origins which have been incorporated
 
into da?r Isha?q.Despite this,da?r Isha?q remains a‘da?r’.One family of da?r Malik of the Ghaz?al
 
converted to Islam more than a hundred years ago and instead of leaving the village as was the
 
custom in such cases,was incorporated into the constituent family(‘a?’ila)from which sprang
 
the current Muslim mukhtar (village headman) and chief benefactor, Hamdan. Hamdan’s
 
family itself married into da?r Isha?q about three generations ago and is thus not purely derived
 
from that original ancestor.Another such incorporation into the ostensibly‘pure’families of the
 
descendants of Isha?q occurred with the immigration of a Muslim family from the village of
 
Shuqba approximately two hundred years ago.Incorporation was achieved through unbalanced
 
exchange of wives and land.The dominant clan provided wives for the incorporated families
 
and granted them land from its holdings.The incoming families were thus socially encompassed
 
in the inferior position of recipient of the generosity of da?r Isha?q,echoing the subjugation of the
 
Wazı?r.The significance of such dilutions of the‘purity’of descent from Isha?q has been reduced
 
by these encompassing movements which have been achieved within the logic of the kinship
 
system.The interests of both da?r Isha?q and the Wazı?r are served by the former’s concealment
 
of diverse ancestry and the latter’s acquiescence in its encompassment,and in other emphases
 
on unity,such as the consolidation of Muslim guesthouses into one.Both groups are able to hide
 
2 At least in terms of kinship idiom if not actual relation.
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and deny ancestral diversity and so claim the substantial social and cultural capital of being
‘asabı?.The Christians,however,do not claim that they are‘asabı?and so do not claim a share
 
of the attendant social and cultural capital; indeed, they actually acknowledge and even
 
proclaim their diversity.Although interrelation through inter-clan marriage is common the
 
ancestral diversity of the Christians has not been encompassed by notions of descent from a
 
single person in the same way that it has among the Muslims.These differences are important
 
in current social relations. Muslims freely point to the varied origins of the Christians as
 
distinctive.This is coupled with differentiations based on the denominational diversity of the
 
Christians,who are derided as having “one hundred religions”as against the Muslims’religious
 
unity.Indeed,the most important feature of Muslim communal identity is this distinction based
 
on religious unity and a fictitious idea of kin unity.However,it is not only the Muslims who
 
define themselves through opposition.The very restriction of commonality among the Chris-
tians serves to differentiate them from the Muslims and so maintain them as a communal group
 
in opposition to the latter.
From this it is clear that the logics of the rhetorics and practice of kin relations follow
 
notions of descent from (or relation through)a common ancestor. This is expressed in the
 
vernacular by the concept of being‘asabı?.The clan is the critical unit of kinship in that it is used
 
to denote the limits of‘asabı?ya in the ideal.The Christians’falling short of that ideal contrasts
 
with the Muslims’‘fulfilling’it,maintaining the current political relevance of the term.The
 
notion of relatedness contained in the idea of being‘asabı?disposes Tustası?Muslims to unity and
 
Christians to fragmentation.The Christians say that they are,and are in fact,inhibited in co-
operating communally.Economistic arguments would say that this inhibition stems from the
 
commoditisation of labour and land in integration into the capitalist mode of production.
However, Muslims in Tustas are equally subject to such developments. More useful is an
 
argument that culture(and cultural logics)are implicated in the difference,without denying the
 
influence of material developments as historical circumstances.The seat of Christian feelings of
 
fragmentation in terms of kinship is based on the cultural definition and importance of‘asabı?ya
 
and the Christian Tustası?s’manifest lack (in their own terms)of that quality.The Muslims,on
 
the other hand,can claim to be‘asabı?and a single hamu?la,realising (though imperfectly,in fact)
the cultural ideal.As a result,kinship operates as a structuring disposition (cf.Bourdieu 1977;
1990).It provides the Muslims with an idiom appropriate to the communitarianism that they
 
wish to promote.It does not provide the Christians with such an idiom however,and instead is
 
divisive.Structures of social life are also implicated in this.
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Da?r Isha?q is able,by virtue of its power and numerical superiority,to overshadow the Wazı?r
 
and the Na?bulsı?,and so to overlook the disparate origins of the last two.There is no similarly
 
dominant grouping among the Christians. These features of local social structure provide
 
family or kin relations with a role in defining Muslim communitarian identity,while presenting
 
kinship as an idiom of division rather than unity among the Christians.Because they stem from
 
such structural features these may be considered structured dispositions.Such dispositions are
 
expressed in various ways and at all levels of social life.For example,soon after my field work
 
began,as a way of making myself known to the villagers and acquainting myself with them,
in time-honoured anthropological fashion I started asking about ancestry and recording
 
genealogies.The responses of Christians and Muslims were very different.I made my very first
 
attempt when one day,returning home from a (Muslim)shop in the village,I noticed a large
 
group of Muslims in their communal sitting-place (maq‘ad). I joined them and, having only
 
recently arrived and as a way of introducing myself as an anthropologist (something I never
 
concealed)as well as satisfying the almost palpable curiosity about what I should actually do
 
there,I asked informally and without any great expectations for information on their ancestors;
they responded very enthusiastically and in a particular way.In the space of about half an hour,
as the result of energetic explanation as entertaining to the many tellers as to me the listener,
I was presented with a communal chart tracing descent forward in time from the original
 
ancestor Ishaq,through his five sons to the present generation of young men.In this only male
 
descendants were enumerated.
Buoyed by this experience I set about a similar exercise among the Christians.However,
different patterns of socialising among them forced me to gather kinship and genealogical
 
information from individual households.In response I received information going backwards in
 
time from the present generation.In this the informant might remember his or her own or his
 
parents’siblings.Quickly,however,collateral branches were forgotten and only direct ances-
tors could be presented.For example,‘Yu?suf’s father was Jiryis and Jiryis’father was Salma?n;
Salma?n’s father was Suleiman; the father of Suleiman was Ibrahı?m, ‘and so forth. This
 
continued, generally through seven or eight notional generations,with the man (again, only
 
male ancestors were presented)named last being the posited original ancestor for that ‘a?’ila?.
3 This accords with the situation more generally in Palestine(cf.Atran 1986).
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 Religious Logics of Unity and Fragmentation
 
Religious relations also structure dispositions to unity and fragmentation. There is no
 
denominational variety among Tustasi Muslims.However,denominational variety among the
 
Christians doubly emphasises the limits of commonality.
The division of the Christians into Catholic and Orthodox is the feature by which their two
 
hamu?las are most commonly distinguished. This is more interesting than it might at first
 
appear since the incident which triggered the split involved difficulties in a marriage across
 
hamu?la lines.It could,therefore,form a well-known and public example that relations across
 
hamu?la boundaries are, in fact, not extraordinary. Instead it is used, albeit indirectly, to
 
promote greater distinction into sub-groups within the Christian community, following the
 
logics and dispositions that we have already noted.
The division into Catholic and Greek Orthodox, which occurred towards the end of the
 
nineteenth century,predominantly followed hamu?la lines with the Ghazal by and large becom-
ing Catholic and the Faras remaining Orthodox.The establishment of an Anglican community
 
dates from before the First World War and was due to missionary activity.The number of its
 
adherents has fallen to the point where it is restricted to one household of five people.Even at
 
their peak, however, the Anglicans came mainly from one da?r. The passage of the older
 
generation will see the obliteration of even that presence.A Pentecostal Evangelical group
 
dates from about the beginning of the Israeli occupation.Though small(not more than about
 
fifty adults)it is quite eclectic,at least in terms of the kinship of its members.These differences
 
between the denominations have been influenced by two factors working on each other:the
 
historical circumstances in which the mass of conversions took place;and the cultural logics of
 
the churches themselves and how they relate to conversion and membership.
Although membership of both the Catholic and Orthodox churches predominantly follows
 
clan lines,and is spoken of in those terms,there is a remarkable degree of latitude in adherence.
For example,one family of da?r Akhdar of the Faras,the ostensibly‘Orthodox’clan,contains
 
Orthodox parents, three avowedly atheistic Communist sons (who nevertheless attend cere-
monies in both the Catholic and Orthodox churches),an evangelical Protestant daughter-in-
law,and another son training to be a Catholic priest.Such variation occurs,however,between
 
members of households rather than between the da?rs of families. It is thus centred on the
 
individual rather than the da?r or any wider kin structures.This is to be expected in an era of
 
28
 
greater individualism.
Membership of the so-called Church of God is made up of individuals rather than da?rs or
 
larger kin groups which have embraced its doctrines.Some may wish to argue that it is in the
 
nature of the act of proselytisation that individuals should be converted rather than groups.
However,history is replete with examples of whole tribes,clans,countries,and even empires?
being converted when the social structures obtaining emphasise a suitably communalistic
 
regime. It is instructive that conversion to Catholicism at the end of the nineteenth century
 
should be collective and rely on kin units and practice while conversion to the evangelical
 
Protestantism of the Church of God which began in the village in 1967 should be based on the
 
individual.The arrival of the first missionary from the Church of God preceded the arrival of
 
the Israelis only by a matter of months. The bulk of its activities, therefore, have been
 
conducted at the same time as the integration of the village into the Israeli economy has
 
occurred. Economic transformation has been accompanied by a transformation from col-
lectivity to individuality.Conversion to the Church of God,occurring during a period of greater
 
individualism has been individual.
Beyond these historical circumstances, however, the logics of conversion of the different
 
churches themselves are also important. Evangelical Protestantism as found in Tustas is
 
distinct from the Greek Orthodoxy,Roman Catholicism and Anglicanism also found there.In
 
defining membership of their respective churches these last three emphasise the family or kin
 
much more than does the Church of God.This is expressed through the ritual of infant baptism
 
in which the family first incorporates its members into the church.Rituals of confirmation also
 
represent an incorporation of the individual into the church through the family.The cultural
 
logic operating in this is based on notions of kinship and collectivity.
The evangelical Protestants,however,exhibit a different logic.Rather than emphasising the
 
incorporation of the individual through the family they stress a logic of personal responsibility
 
for guilt,conversion,and salvation.No-one but the individual can offer his or her soul to God.
Thus,infant baptism is frowned upon.Only adults acting as individuals are baptised into the
 
Church.Because of these logics it is not surprising that conversion to the Church of God has
 
4 Witness the Emperor Constantine and the conversion of the Roman Empire;also, Sahlins’(1981;
1985) discussion of the wholesale dissolution of traditional Hawaiian cosmology and a similar
 
widespread adoption of Christianity and Western customs.
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been of individuals and not families in contrast to conversion to Catholicism and Anglicanism.
Nor is it surprising that individualistic conversion has largely occurred since 1967,when the
 
people have been most exposed to the individuating influences of the world-system and wage
 
labour.
Socially,the division of the Christians into different denominations accentuates their separa-
tion from the Muslims in religious terms as different ancestry does in kin. Thus, while
 
denominational and kin division would appear to negate the power of notions of‘hamu?la’and
‘religion’among the Christians they in fact help maintain that power.Their very problematic
 
status for Christians in contrast with their unproblematic status among the Muslims maintains
 
their power for differentiation.
Apprehensions of Unity and Fragmentation
 
Feelings of falling apart
 
The idea of communal fragmentation has become part of the Muslims’conception of the
 
Christians.It has also become part of the latter’s own self perception.This reflexive conscious-
ness was clear,for example,when the young man Jiryis mentioned to me(while the two of us
 
were walking in the street)that,“before the Israelis came the people were poor but since then
 
they have become rich.This new wealth has lead to a weakness of social relations so that
 
people are concerned with their self interest only,and not with the good of their fellows or of
 
the village;they don’t co-operate.”
Most inhabitants (Christians especially),young and old,more and less educated,follow his
 
argument that the fragmentation that they feel has been caused by economic forces.Even as
 
venerable a man as Abu?Yu?suf of the Ghaza?l implicates the rise of materialism in the decline
 
of unity.The Christians“have become distant from each other.There is no respect and they
 
insult each other.The reason for this is the same here as everywhere else in the world:material
 
things are more important than spiritual matters for the people.”For Abu? Ta?hir, another
 
elderly member of the Ghazal,“when one has money,work,a house,a car and so on he is
 
inclined to think that he does not need others and not to treat them with respect.”
Previously,the hamu?las were controlled by a very few men,communal leaders who are,at
 
least as far as the Christians are concerned, now lost. Under this system the village was
 
dominated by about six notables (ikba?r;senior men), each of the Christian hamu?las and the
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Muslim super-hamu?la providing two.The influence of these men covered virtually all aspects
 
of social life.However,the system broke down with the deaths of the last group of six.This
 
occurred progressively from the 1950s to 1970.As they died no new aspirants rose to fill their
 
places?.Power and influence now reside with those possessing money and formal education.For
 
the more political youth these old men (ikhtiya?rı?ya)and the authority that they held represent
 
a “dictatorship”(dikta?turı?ya)which they are glad is no longer in place. Previously, people
 
accepted the“dictatorship”of the notables because they were dependent for their subsistence
 
on the kin units and other village networks and structures controlled by them. Now that
 
material conditions have changed the generality of villagers is less inclined to accept subjection
 
to such leaders than their ancestors were.For youths (shaba?b)the collapse of that system is
 
central to the development of political and nationalist consciousness which they take to
 
differentiate their current situation from what went before.Others are more ambivalent,seeing
 
this loss as accompanied by a loss of community. In the words of Abu Rafı?q,of the Faras,
“unlike the Muslims we are divided because we have no elders of stature.The elders of the
 
Muslims are forward-looking, fearless and always thinking of how they can improve the
 
situation of their community.We,however,have been divided by different families trying to
 
place themselves above others which has lead to real feuds.”Thus,the Christians are presented
 
as riven by family and individual disputes,which quickly become familial,in contrast to the
 
Muslims,with their strong leaders,concerned to maintain the harmony of their community as
 
a way of improving its situation.
The problem of fragmentation,for it is more often than not seen by Tustası?s as a problem,
is seen to affect all relations to the extent that they decry Arab disorganisation and the
 
excessive individualism of “each person...［wanting］... to go his own way”without group
 
discipline. Inhabitants, such as ‘Afı?fa of the Ghaza?l,argue that it is because of this that the
 
Arabs“cannot accomplish anything and remain weak.”
Those who currently have influence in any way resembling that of the previous regime of
 
notables are found among the Muslims. This is not surprising as the structural and logical
 
configurations of that confession dispose it to the development of such figures of authority.The
 
religious unity of the Muslims, in tandem with their structural dispositions, inclines them to
 
acceptance of a single religio-political party:the Muslim Brothers (MB).This domination by
 
5 This occurred because the two bases of the notables’power(namely,control over village land and
 
labour)were virtually destroyed by the integration of the village into the world economy.
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the MB represents a transformation of the Muslims’communal alliance into a political
 
allegiance.Because of this overwhelming adherence to a single political force activists among
 
the Muslim Brothers are able to exercise authority in the general Muslim community.Signifi-
cantly,however,this authority derives from their positions in a structure originating outside the
 
village.The notables derived their authority from power bases centred on the village.The fact
 
that the current activists are also educated further indicates the supersession of village-based
 
power by externally-based power,in this case the formal education structure.
Hamda?n, the Muslim millionaire, also draws his power from non-traditional sources. He
 
made a fortune through lending money in the village.However,unlike other village money-
lenders who are now relatively poor,he removed most of his assets from the village economy
 
as early as the 1950s.He established retail stores overseas and invested on overseas stock
 
markets. His wealth gives him influence in the village but the base of his power lies in
 
investments outside it.
There are no figures among the Christians similarly able to assert dominance based on
 
external sources of power.There is no-one of wealth comparable to Hamda?n.On the other
 
hand, the Christians do have political activists in profusion. However, because there is no
 
political party with either a following or influence as widespread as that enjoyed by the MB
 
among the Muslims,none of the political activists can claim to speak for the Christians as such.
The very diversity of Christian politics means that Christian activists may have their authority
 
accepted by adherents of their particular party but not necessarily by the Christians as a whole,
who may follow other parties or none at all.Among the Muslims,even those who have little
 
interest in organised politics cannot escape identification as Muslims.The totalising effect of
 
Islam,particularly in Muslim Tustas with its emphasis on religious and kin unity,means that
 
to be a Tustası?Muslim is to accept the MB and its political authority as much as it means to
 
share a sense of kin relatedness through Isha?q as putative ancestor of the super-hamu?la.
Indeed,many Christians present their division into different political parties as a‘reason’for
 
their fragmentation. For the politically sophisticated Abu? Ba?sim, “the advent of different
 
political parties has increased differences among the Christians.These days they are divided
 
into those who support Fatah and Arafat and those who support others,”including the Palestine
 
People’s Party(PPP).If,however,the advent of such parties was a reason for the fragmenta-
tion of the Christians we might expect similar developments among the Muslims.However,the
 
MB claims the allegiance of Muslims in the village to such an extent that no-one is prepared
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to identify himself as a supporter of other groups.If,on the other hand,we take the‘unity’of
 
the Muslims as a prior phenomenon which encourages such developments,this more satisfacto-
rily fits with the emerging picture of bifurcation between the two communities.As far as the
 
Christians are concerned,it is more satisfactory,for the moment,to posit economic transforma-
tion, in concert with the cultural logic of restricted commonality expressed in their kin
 
rhetorics and practices,as underlying the collapse of the system of communal leadership among
 
them.In this,the greater economic independence of those working as wage labourers in Israel
 
and the restricted sense of commonality are important.Among the Muslims also the integration
 
of the village into the world economy resulted in the supersession of the power bases of the
 
traditional notables?.However,the logical configurations of the Muslims,combined with the
 
circumstance of the millionaire’s wealth, mean that figures of authority accepted by the
 
community as a whole have now risen up.
Tustası?youth (in common perhaps with youth everywhere), feel powerless and frustrated
 
because of the influence of their elders and the importance that the latter attach to controlling
 
and implementing decisions through traditional channels.Taking such complaints at face value
 
we might conclude that traditional political and power structures remain very strong and,
perhaps,unchallenged.However,we do know(as the elders too are aware)that the political
 
affiliation of the youth is based around modern political parties and organisations such as the
 
PPP, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP),and the MB-Hamas.Of
 
these the PPP is the largest and most influential group among the Christians.Second to the
 
PPP is the DFLP. Politically active youth claim to have modern political and nationalist
 
consciousness unlike their elders.The traditional political pattern in which all the members of
 
a family follow the same political party (and the same religious denomination, among the
 
Christians)no longer holds sway.Instead,Christian adherents of different religious denomina-
tions and supporters of different political parties are commonly found in one family. For
 
example,while one high school educated Christian of twenty-nine years supports the DFLP
 
only one of his brothers does likewise;of the other two one supports the PPP and the third,
while politically active to the point of having been in detention for six months,terms himself
 
a nationalist and a supporter of the PLO but seeks to evade identification with a particular
 
party. Such complexity is not surprising in a situation (which we are elaborating)of rising
 
6 Of course,the same forces operated more widely throughout Palestinian society.A broader discus-
sion of notable families in Palestinian politics may be found in Muslih (1988),Khalaf (1991), and
 
Sahliyeh (1988).
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individualism.
The ideal of unity and the logic of religious definition
 
We have already seen that subjectively many informants of both confessions see religion as
 
underlying the Muslims’unity while contributing to the division of the Christians.More than
 
this,the structural dispositions of the two communities are such that the idiom of religion is
 
available to the Muslims as a vehicle for mobilisation to unity while it is not to the Christians.
Of course the division of Islam into its own denominations,or ways(turuq),confers as much
 
potential for difference in Islam as there is in Christianity.While all Muslims in Tustas are
 
Sunni the possibility of using religious texts and practices in order to express political differ-
ences is still present. The point is that Tustası?Muslims do not express political or social
 
differences through the idiom of religion.Rather that idiom is used to mobilise the community
 
to unity.Just as a logic of kinship is used to promote the Muslims as one,so a religious logic
 
is used to promote them as a single community.It is then claimed by the Muslims,and accepted
 
by the Christians,that their communal solidarity derives from their sharing one undifferentiat-
ed religion.
The relation of the fragmentation of the Christians to religion hinges on their division into
 
denominations.The Catholic schoolteacher Abu Riziq expressed this interestingly by projecting
 
his argument onto the historical example of the extinguishing of Christianity on the Arabian
 
Peninsula at the time of Muhammad and immediately afterwards.This example is of great
 
interest to a community as anxious about its future as Tustası?Christians are.In his account,
“the reason that the Christians in the Arabian Peninsula,which was previously completely
 
Christian, were conquered by the Muslims and forced to become Muslims themselves was
 
because the growth of denominational differences and war between the Christians of different
 
tribes and denominations［qaba?’il wa mila?l］had left them weak.”Another Christian of the
 
Ghaza?l,who was present at this time,agreed with his friend’s example and added that“these
 
divisions are present even today and are the cause of our weakness.”This provides an almost
 
perfect allusion to the condition of the Christian community in Tustas,where denominational
 
and clan divisions are present and the Christians feel themselves divided and weak and at risk
 
of subjection to Muslims or extermination by them.
Abu?Riziq then went on to say of the Muslims that“they have one religion and one book,but
 
we are divided into one hundred religions and do not have one book.”This characterisation is
 
34
 significant. It is a key Muslim characterisation which extends to their religious realm the
 
positive valuation of unity found in the ideal of being ‘asabi while at the same time relegating
 
the Christians to that lower and disdained level of division. Abu? Riziq, along with other
 
Christian villagers,has internalised this distinction and the negative valuation of Christians and
 
their disunity contained in it.He(in common with the Christians more widely)has accepted the
 
distinction and characterisation of the Christians as having“one hundred religions”even though
 
he is quite capable of distinguishing between ‘religion’(dı?n) and ‘denomination’(milla). In
 
referring to the Christians as not having one book he meant that the different translations of
 
the Bible amounted to different books,indicating an internalisation of the Muslim conception
 
of the unalterable nature of the language of the Qur’a?n.This informant has set up a bi-axial
 
definition of religious groups based on the terms ‘religion’and ‘book’and has placed the
 
Muslims and Christians in opposite quadrants;the former in that of high unity values with one
 
religion and one book,and the latter in that of high fragmentation with one hundred religions
 
and many books (see Diagram 1,below). Such characterisation of the two religious groups,
based on the presence or absence of denominational diversity and on internalisation of aspects
 
of Muslim beliefs of the nature of Arabic as the language of God and so unalterable, is
 
widespread.It expresses,simultaneously,the religious logic to the unity of the Muslims and the
 
fragmentation of the Christians.Villagers of both confessions have internalised this view to the
 
extent that the concepts of religious unity and fragmentation that it underlies are taken for
 
granted.
For the mass of informants of both confessions there is little idea that the divisions among
＞1
［“100”］
＞1 
book
 
religion
 
Diagram 1:the logic of religious definition
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Christians
 
Muslims
 the Christians may be beneficial.Rather they are dominated by the idea that deviation from a
 
perceived previous unity(which includes a unity of opinion or persuasion)is debilitating.Only
 
politically committed Christians who are deeply indoctrinated in ideologies of democracy put
 
forward the idea that diversity might be a positive strength.They cite the example of the PLO
 
and the Palestinian parliament and their internal diversity as something positive and indicating
 
their fundamental democratic nature?and the potential for the development of a democratic
 
Palestinian state.Even they,however,recognise that without constant effort to strengthen the
 
ideals of tolerance that they see the PLO as embodying,they might not see democracy in such
 
a future state.Hence,current distaste for the activities of the PNA and Arafat’s‘government’.
I am not here arguing that the Christians’concerns about division are misplaced.Indeed,as
 
a community having different denominations and kin divisions (especially in a situation of
 
integration into the market economy characterised by individual wage labour,and in which the
 
greatest advantages lie with the economic individual),adherence to any particular party by an
 
overwhelming majority of the community is unlikely.To the extent that unity in religion(which
 
they take to encompass politics) is important for the Muslims’self-definition they are less
 
susceptible to the attractions of differing parties, and any movement to fragmentation sees
 
attempts to check it. In this context the MB can stand most effectively to differentiate the
 
Muslims from the Christians as Muslim,‘asabı?,and religiously and politically united.While the
 
Christians have separated their idioms of kinship,religion,and politics from each other, the
 
Muslims have not.Because of this,the religious aspects of their identity serve a different role
 
from those of the Christians.To this extent the position that the Muslims derive unity from
 
their religion makes sense?.
Another aspect of the villagers’apprehensions of unity and fragmentation are contrasting
 
Muslim confidence and Christian self-doubt over their physical courage and spirit.There is a
 
7 Notwithstanding the current problems with the Palestinian leadership.
8 However,the Muslims are not as united as their own presentation is meant to suggest.Ten years
 
before my field work there was a ferocious fight among them,between the Wazı?r and‘the people of
 
the quarter’(ahl al-ha?ra;i.e.,the group descended from the ancestor Isha?q.This name is a further
 
expression of that group’s complete domination of the Muslim community terming,as it does, the
 
Muslim quarter‘their’quarter and excluding the Wazı?r).It started as a quarrel between two men but
 
turned into general strife,with battles being fought on the streets between the two opposing sides.
However,following the disposition to unity over fragmentation and in real contrast to the Christians
 
who remain divided by lesser differences,the rift was repaired and since then things have been more
 
or less peaceful,although,some tensions remain,under the surface.
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widespread belief among Tustası?Christians, expressing their feelings of fragmentation and
 
weakness,that they have lost a mettle possessed in abundance by their predecessors.Tustası?
Muslims have no such self-conception as lacking or having lost courage. They proclaim an
 
enthusiastic willingness to die in the struggle with Israel and keenly embrace the idea of
 
martyrdom.
In the past the villagers generally took great pride in their fighting capacities and men,who
 
were called into action as recently as the 1930s when a pitched battle was fought between
 
Christians and Muslims with firearms being used.Today,the Christian teaching of non-violence
 
is invoked in that confession to explain and justify what previously would have been regarded
 
as cowardice,indicating that it has become beneficial for a large number of Christians to justify
 
non-violence.The fragmentation of the Christian community is a factor in this:it simply is not
 
be able to mount collective actions and sustain the organisation and discipline needed for the
 
use of violence.This is exacerbated by the change of the primary focus of any such violent acts
 
from intra-village or local groups to the Israeli state,as this requires a different organisation
 
to sustain any campaign over a longer period of time.Moreover,Israeli policies have acted to
 
encourage a devaluation of public confrontation with the state and a withdrawal to concentrate
 
on familial and private arenas (Lustick 1980;Cohen 1974).Policies of minimal direct interfer-
ence in the daily life of those who do not actively oppose the occupation,and of deportation,
gaol and other forms of harassment for those who do, are designed to achieve this. The
 
structural position of the Christians,including their separation of political,religious,and kin
 
realms and fragmentation within those realms,as well as their restricted sense of commonality
 
enhance the effect of such tactics.In contrast,the structural position of the Muslims with their
 
maintenance of the political,religious,and kin realms as related,and unity within those realms,
their extended commonality beyond the village or the borders of Palestine to the wider Muslim
 
world,and Islamic valuations of martyrdom and struggle create a disposition to action regard-
less of its cost to the individual.
Local uses of ethnic, nationalist, and international discourses
 
Conceptions of ethnic group and origins are also used to stake political claims.They also
 
work on a level which encompasses the communal distinctions to which we have paid most
 
attention so far. The question of the ethnic origins of the Palestinian people is one that
 
particularly exercises the minds of the political youth.Their elders spend little time on it;nor
 
are the inactive youth much concerned with it.The active youth,however,use it explicitly as
 
an idiom in which political claims may be staked. Though there are many phrasings and
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individual variations on these themes,the general thrust of argument is as follows.
The ancient peoples of the Middle East,the Canaanites,Chaldeans,and the Assyrians,
were originally Arabs.The Jews themselves originated in the Arabian peninsula.Though
 
there was an Arab expansion from the peninsula at the time of Muhammad,the original
 
inhabitants of Palestine were Arabs.All that happened at the time of Muhammad was that
 
the people here embraced Islam.There were Arabs here but they were Christians.［The
 
ideas contained in these last two sentences are generally associated with Muslim infor-
mants and are‘supported’by reference to the Qur’a?n and stories about Abraham and the
 
Patriarchs.］The history of the Arabs in this land goes back for thousands of years but the
 
history of the Jews here only goes back three hundred,to the time when European Jews
 
began to come here.The Arabs are all one people and all look the same and speak the same
 
language.The Jews,on the other hand,because of their dispersal around the world,are no
 
longer the same people but are a mixture held together by their religion.If you look at Jews
 
from Europe or Africa they look like the natives of those places.The Jews come from
 
many different lands and speak many different languages. They are, in fact, different
 
peoples, and only share a religion, which is the only thing that they have in common.
Furthermore,the Jews were here for a short time,long ago,and then they left.The Arabs
 
were in Spain and then left.Do the Arabs have any claims to Spain?Of course not.Then,
do the Jews have any claim to Palestine?No!?
This composite view,widely expressed in its different aspects by youths of both confessions??,
has interesting implications for how those who subscribe to it see themselves and their political
 
claims vis-a-vis the Israelis.There is,for example,a claim of greater continuity in the country
 
for Palestinians based on the idea of occupation through time:the Palestinians claim thousands
 
of years while limiting the claim of the Israelis to a mere three hundred,thus circumventing the
 
Zionists’claims back to the time of the ancient Israelites. This is not done by denying the
 
presence of the Israelites but by denying continuity between those ancient inhabitants and the
 
cosmopolitan Israelis of today.As a second circumvention of the usual Zionist claims, it is
 
asserted that all the ancient inhabitants of the land were Arabs anyway.This tactic creates an
 
implicit distinction between Palestinian Jews, that is, those who trace their ancestry in
 
Palestine to the period before the incursions of European Jews and who may thus be credited
 
with continuity of a similar legitimacy to that of the Palestinian Arabs,and those Jews who
 
came to Palestine through immigration,especially from the eighteenth century.This distinction
 
9  Synthetic account.
10 except for the two sentences noted as associated with Muslim informants.
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does not always remain implicit;those who advocate the repatriation of Israelis state it clearly.
For example,Jiryis said that“those who were living in Palestine before may remain,but all the
 
others must return to the countries from which they came,including those born in Israel after
 
1948.”
An attempt is made to impugn Jewish claims of commonality by arguing that their division
 
into different countries and states around the world has led to their becoming different peoples.
Arabs on the other hand,in spite of their division into different states,are still seen to be one
 
people.This implies that Arabs have been able to retain continuity with their primordial roots
 
which allows them to maintain a high degree of commonality.Jews,however,are reckoned to
 
have a tenuous or non-existent continuity with their pre-Diaspora roots,which compromises
 
their degree of commonality. The claims of Arab commonality are supported by a shared
 
language.While all informants are aware that Arabs speak different vernacular dialects,which
 
may at times be almost mutually incomprehensible, the existence of standard and classical
 
Arabic serves to unite them and on it they can base claims of unity.Hebrew,on the other hand,
is argued to have been re-invented in the nineteenth century and therefore to be an artificial
 
creation which cannot be used to make similar claims for Jews.
It is also interesting that Jews are regarded as being different peoples by virtue of coming
 
from different countries,while the children of village emigrants living overseas are taken to be
 
Palestinians and Arab even if they speak only the language of their host country,and even if
 
only the father is Palestinian.The highly politicised status of the ethnic idiom makes the youth
 
adamant in asserting that for themselves and others, except for Jews,ethnic identity is not
 
dependent on language or place of birth.This apparent contradiction is necessary,however,if
 
they are to subvert Jewish ethnic claims without doing the same to their own.Of course,it could
 
be rendered less damaging by arguing that it was the length of time that the Jews spent in
 
Diaspora that caused them to become different peoples,but no-one argued this with me or in
 
my presence.On the other hand the definition of Jews as different peoples sharing a religion
 
does not contradict that feature of identification that we have already explored:that religion
 
is not basic to ethnic identity for these Palestinians.In contrast to the characterisation of the
 
Jews,Palestinians may be thought of as one people even though different religions may be
 
found among them,as is an inescapable fact of life for these people.There is a denial of deep
 
commonality among Jews except in religion,which is not considered central to identification
 
as a people,whereas the commonality of Palestinians lies in their race or kind and is expressed
 
in their appearance and language.
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This is the Palestinian side of what Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (1988)has termed‘the politics of
 
negation’.In that politics Zionists and Israelis denied Palestinians’rights to Palestine and the
 
establishment of a state therein (I.Abu-Lughod 1988:194).The other aspect of that politics is
 
that Palestinians and other Arabs negated Zionist claims of the reality of a Jewish people whose
 
fulfilment required a homeland or state in Palestine.We have just seen that villagers in Tustas
 
do this.This politics is the context in which Tustasi youth make their ethnic claims and in
 
which those claims are meaningful and political.This context thus influences the form that the
 
claims take.
This use of a discourse of ethnicity indicates that not only‘local’terms and discourses are
 
important.Local historical,political,religious,and customary elements are used to establish
 
claims of greater or lesser commonality and longer or shorter continuity from the level of intra-
hamu?la relations to that of relations between cultures.However,modern ‘global’discourses
 
such as those of‘nationalism’and‘human rights’also have powerful roles in this situation??.
It is not by chance that these terms come to be used at the national level,among commenta-
tors,and on the local level.Expressions in terms of national(and human)rights both allow the
 
Palestinians understanding of their position in relation to situations elsewhere and permit that
 
understanding to be conveyed to the wider world. The transmission of such Palestinian
 
understandings to the world has of prime importance since the first intifada itself.This was
 
necessary because of the general development of territorial and national identity as a dominant
 
world-political discourse in this century??.
11 Christianity and Islam as religions pretending to world relevance also deserve to be treated as
‘global’discourses in some contexts.However,as I plan elsewhere to discuss in some detail their roles
 
in the dynamics of sub-national social definition I shall not do so here,except briefly to mention the
 
impact of religious terms through the underlying goal of the MB.That goal is to re-socialise the mass
 
of the populace (seen by the Muslim Brothers as having fallen away from Islam)to follow more
 
closely Islamic precepts and teachings in their daily life and social intercourse.Members of the MB
 
believe that in achieving this, a state organised along Muslim lines will be attained as the whole
 
fabric of society will then be influenced by Islam. The underlying goal is “the liberation of the
［Islamic］homelands from new ways of thinking which have penetrated Islam.”The new ideas from
 
which supporters of the MB consider it necessary to liberate the Islamic homelands are those of
 
Marxism, socialism, capitalism, secularism, and even nationalism. An attempt is being made to
 
organise the Muslim community and unite it without reference to“new”and foreign discourses and
 
ideologies,but by reliance on a religion which can simultaneously be claimed to be‘local,’‘Arab,’and
‘global.’However,as we have seen,the structural position of the Christians leads them to a different,
and politically secular,solution to their problems.
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More particularly in relation to Palestine(but stemming from those more general develop-
ments) the nationalism of the Zionists and their denial of the Palestinians’rights of self-
determination created a politics in which nationalist and human-rights terms were highly
 
significant. Indeed, Palestinian identity of the pre-modern period??was based on actors’
religious,cultural,and geographical (or town,village,and tribal)background (I.Abu-Lughod
 
1988;Muslih 1988). The introduction of territorially based identity was, in this context, an
 
anachronism brought in by the Zionists and their sympathisers.In doing this,however,the three
 
fundamental issues structuring discourse on Palestine since then(land,people,and the political
 
sovereignty of a people and land)were introduced and transformed the base of politics and the
 
expression of political struggle.The invocation of discourses of human rights both by Jews and
 
more widely since the Second World War have also influenced Palestinian national politics by
 
making them basic terms of both understanding and communication.
Global discourses of nationalism and human rights have influenced,and are expressed on,the
 
local level also.Randa,a young Christian woman in her twenties,is typical of the youth who
 
see themselves as more conscious politically than their elders.She was firmly of the view that,
“Only the old people who lived under Hussein and those teachers and officials who received
 
money from the Jordanian Government had any love for Jordan. True Palestinians always
 
wanted and always will want to be independent and how can we be so under Jordanian rule?We
 
stand alone.No-one will help us;not other Arab countries;not America.They are actively
 
against us. I am a human being［insa?n］and must have my rights.There is no country that
 
wants to be ruled by another. Do you want your country to be ruled by foreigners?”The
 
implication is,of course,that I should not.In this way she expresses Palestinian demands for
 
independence as basic,universal,human demands.No mystical or special attention is paid to
 
the land of Palestine.The relationship of the Palestinians to their land is not made more special
 
than that of any other people to theirs; on the contrary it is similar and hence directly
 
comparable.In all ways the Palestinians are to be considered like all other peoples around the
 
world.The things that they want,demand,and deserve are universally wanted,demanded,and
 
deserved as “rights.”Old people and the less well-educated might articulate feelings of the
 
12 See I.Abu-Lughod (1988);Anderson (1983);Kamenka (1973);Gellner (1983).
13 Abu-Lughod does not define this period,but it definitely included the Turkish period and perhaps
 
the early part of the British.In my terms the‘modern period’would begin,in Tustas,in the early
 
Mandate period.It was then that the village experienced the more radical integration into the world
 
system,manifested in the great expansion of communications,the money economy,and trade,which
 
was crucially influential in the structural and dispositional developments occurring in this century.
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uniqueness of the Palestinian position and predicament,such as an old uneducated member of
 
the Ghaza?l who wails that“there is no country in all the world as devastated as Palestine.No-
one suffers conditions as bad as we have.Ours are the worst conditions in the world.”However,
younger people such as Randa submerge any such special claims under the invocation of
 
universal human and national rights. The problem and the Palestinians’aspirations are not
 
particularly Palestinian or Arab but are universal. For them as actors within the situation,
however,its intensity and seriousness are particular and are such that they do indeed place it
 
at the centre of everything else,as Turki(1976)noted.They(along with many in the West)even
 
see the resolution of this problem as the most important priority for the maintenance of world
 
peace,but that does not threaten the universality of the demands they make,the values that
 
they proclaim,or the terms that they use.
My observations also support the idea expressed by youths that their elders are not so
 
conscious politically,at least not in the same way,as the youth.Rather than talking in terms
 
of establishing an independent state,the elderly and many middle-aged more often mentioned
 
how they desired peace.Generally,they were unconcerned regarding the form of government
 
to be adopted after solution of the Palestinian problem,whether a fully independent Palestinian
 
state,or independence with some limitations (for example as an unarmed state).By contrast,
the youth consistently demanded a fully independent and sovereign state and had more detailed
 
understanding of and interest in the PLO’s policies and positions??.Older informants accepted
 
the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people but without such
 
detailed knowledge or interest.
For the politically active Christian youth the most important feature distinguishing them
 
from the elders is that they consider themselves to have modern political consciousness??.For
 
politically active Muslim youth an important feature of their distinctiveness and basis for their
 
projected certain success is their religiosity, most importantly consisting of religious faith,
14 This was evident during the uprising,for example, from the plethora of graffiti which came to
 
cover most of the public frontages in the village after the beginning of the intifada.These graffiti
 
originated in the two Christian quarters,later spreading to the Muslim also.Generally,they consisted
 
of stock sentences examples of which would be found in all three quarters.I found the same or very
 
similar sentences in other villages in the area,indicating that they were not purely the expressions
 
of individual graffitists.However,with their explicit expressions of support or an antagonism toward
 
specific policies,positions,or organisations they both reflected the changing situation and provided
 
commentaries on that situation.
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knowledge and adherence.This however,does not lead to a distinction based on the develop-
ment of a modern political consciousness,however.Rather,it indicates the development of a
 
new relation between religion and the new politics. Even the Great Strike of 1936 and the
 
concurrent political campaign which these elders proudly named the Revolution(ath-thaura)is
 
seen by their descendants as something of a different order from the Uprisings of recent years
 
because the people today have national consciousness and the leadership is formed differently
 
from the more traditional leaders of the 1930s(cf.Swedenburg 1995).Christian youth feel able
 
to put their faith in these developments as ensuring the eventual success of their movement,in
 
contrast to the religious Muslims’expressions of millenarianist faith.For people such as Shafiq
 
it is the development of Palestinian nationalism and modern political consciousness which
 
differentiate al-intifada from ath-thaura.He said,
The Great Strike and the early Palestinian movement differed significantly from what
 
is going on now. Firstly, the people have much greater nationalist consciousness［wa’i
 
qaumi］than they did in those days.Then kin ties were more powerful than nationalist
 
consciousness.Nowadays the reverse is true though it needs further development in this
 
direction.In those days people supported one party or another because of family pressure
 
without thinking about their policies or looking at their platforms.Secondly,the leadership
 
today differs greatly from that of the past. Then the country was dominated by the
 
Husseinis and the Nashashibis??;the divisions between them were based on family differ-
ences.They did not have nationalist consciousness and each of them represented only a
 
narrow interest group.Today the leadership is a nationalist leadership and covers all the
 
classes［tabaqa?t］and groups found among the Palestinian people and all their parties,
except for the religious parties;all are found in the Unified Leadership.
Summary
 
In summary,the power and impact of unity and fragmentation in these communities is such
 
that they form a strategic site (Sahlins 1976).However, this does not occur out of nothing,
rather it is through the conjunction of these dispositions with emotionally potent structural
 
facts.Those structural facts are the logics of kin and religious affiliation,which,it is now clear,
do more than simply structure such affiliations. They also provide these communities with
 
powerful idioms for apprehension,and so for action,including political action in a context fully
 
15 This is a very common view among Palestinians more generally.As Swedenburg (1995)found,
Palestinian historiography of the most important Palestinian struggle before the intifada,namely the
 
revolt of 1936-39,routinely dismisses it as politically backward.
16 Two powerful families that dominated Palestinian politics during the British Mandate.
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informed by global discourse such as those of nationalism and human rights.As such,they are
 
a clear example of local structures and dispositions informing and structuring the relation of
 
local communities to global circumstances.
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